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The agricultural  sector  is increasingly  regarded  as  one of the most visible
contributors  to nonpoint source pollution.  Concerns about
environmental  degradation  have contributed  to a growing  consensus  that
environmental  pollution caused  by agriculture  must be monitored  and
controlled.  Environmental  policies  affect  trade  flows,  and trade  policy
will likely affect  the environment.  This explains  the recent  interest  in  the
"greening" of agricultural  trade  (Anderson  and Blackhurst,  1992).
Although agricultural  policy in a few affluent countries  has  responded  to
environmental  concerns,  most countries  have  failed  to integrate
agricultural  and environmental  policy.  This predicament  may  partially be
explained  by  conflicting policy  goals.  For  example,  achieving  self-
sufficiency  through increased  domestic  productiori, independent  of
associated environmental  damage,  may  be a preeminent  policy  goal for
many developing  countries.  A country  exporting  an agricultural  product
may, similarly,  hesitate  to impose  production or input use  restrictions
because such  moves  can erode its  competitive  position  in  export  markets.
This chapter analyzes  some consequences  of agricultural  trade  policy
when  agricultural production  or "bad" input  use adversely  affects  the
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The Environment and International Trade 88environment.  A negative externality  may occur  in either the domestic
production sector or in the foreign production  sector.  Policies  seeking to
promote  exports or to restrict imports can have deleterious  environmental
effects if they stimulate  production of damage-causing  outputs  or use of
damage-causing  inputs.  This situation generates  a conflict between  trade
and environmental  policy goals  in agriculture.
Input- and Output-Related Externalities in Agriculture
The hypothesis  that agricultural  production practices  cause  environmental
damage is well documented  (National Research  Council,  1989; CAEFMS,
1990).  For trade policy analysis, a distinction between  output-related  and
input-related externalities is  important (Bhagwati  and Srinivasan, 1983).
Environmental  damage caused by input use implies an input-related
externality.  In a parallel fashion, when environmental  damage  depends
on output, but cannot be traced to use of a specific input, it  is an output-
related  externality.
From an economic standpoint,  a negative production externality,  be it
output- or input-related,  drives  a wedge between  private  and social  costs.
For an input-related  externality,  this divergence  results in overutilization
of the polluting input.  An output-related  externality  similarly causes
overproduction.
Examples of input-related  externalities  in agriculture are abundant.
Rachel  Carson's early work,  Silent Spring (1962),  drew attention to
damage caused by pesticide use.  Since that  time, this literature  has grown
exponentially,  fueled mainly by a realization  that  the pesticide  pollution
problem  is even greater  than previously  believed.  Pesticides  and
fertilizers  also contaminate  surface  and ground water sources  (Canter,
1986; Nielsen and Lee,  1987).
Livestock  production  is an example  of an output-related  externality in
agriculture.  Production of livestock wastes causes eutrophication  of water
sources,  fish kills, nitrate contamination  of soil and ground  water, and
breeding of insect pests.  Because externality can be reduced  by regulating
livestock production,  it is an output-related  externality.
The broader  consequences of production  externalities  in an open
economy were recently analyzed  (Kurtilla,  1991;  Markusen and
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equilibrium  framework to illustrate potential  conflicts  between  the goals
of trade and  environmental  policy  in agriculture.  First, the environmental
cost of an unlimited production subsidy  is evaluated.  This case was
previously adopted by other researchers  (USDA,  1986; Schmitz  and
others,  1988).
The Environmental  Cost of a U.S.  Deficiency  Payments Program
Consider a  large country  (say, the United States),  and a price-taking
competitor  (say, Canada).  In figure  1, DDus is the domestic  U.S. demand
curve and DD* is  the total demand  curve,  including domestic demand.
SusSus  and SusSuse  are respectively  the private  and social  marginal cost
curves.  The vertical  distance between  these  curves measures the
environmental  cost for that production  unit.  Similarly, DcDc is the
domestic demand  curve in Canada;  ScSc  and ScSce are the  Canadian
private and social marginal cost  curves.
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deficiency  payments  program  is introduced  by setting the target price  P2
above  the world price.  This program  causes  a net  loss  of fhedi  comprised
of a deadweight  loss  edi and a net  transfer to importers  equal  to region
fhei.  The  latter arises  because the program  depresses  world  prices from
P1 to  P4 allowing  importers  to purchase greater  quantities  at lower
prices.  In addition,  an environmental  loss  is generated  in the United
States due to  increased production.
For the competing  exporter  (Canada),  this program  increases  consumers'
surplus by  pmP4P1 and reduces  producers'  surplus  by jnP4P1.  If Canada
chooses  to support producer  income by introducing  a deficiency  payments
program,  the deadweight  loss of such  a program  will  be jkn. Suppose  that
the United States uses  SusSuse to determine  prices  instead  of pricing with
the marginal  private cost  curve.  In  this case, the net loss  in the United
States due to  a deficiency  payments  program is lgcba.  Both  the
deadweight  loss  (acb)  and  the net transfer to  importers  (lgca)  are smaller.
Canadian  exports  are reduced  from ru to tp and the deadweight  loss  due
to a  Canadian  deficiency  payments  program  is rst.
This analysis  suggests  that, when  private and social costs  diverge  in  the
U.S.  production  sector,  there is an additional  environmental  cost  of a
deficiency  payments  program.  Now suppose  that the environmental
externality  is in the production  sector of the  competing  exporter  (fig.  2).
As before,  the target price is P2 so that  the effective  government  subsidy
is P2P3  per  unit.  U.S.  exports  increase  from if to eg, domestic  production
rises  from iP1  to dP2, and domestic  consumption  increases  from  fP1 to
gP3.  The net loss  in the United States  includes  two  components,  fgei
which  is the transfer  to foreign  consumers  in  the form of a  price
reduction,  and  eid which  is the deadweight  loss.
The  U.S. subsidy  displaces  the  Canadian domestic  demand  curve  from
Dcpj  to  Dcmk.  The price reduction  causes a loss to  producers  (joP3P1)
and a  gain to  consumers  (pmP3P1)  in  Canada.  The net  loss is jpmo when
social  costs  are excluded  from consideration.  A U.S.  deficiency  payments
program,  by reducing  Canadian production  from  jP1  to oP3, reduces  the
net environmental  loss by  depressing Canadian  production.  If Canada
compensates  farmers  and restores  price P1  with a Canadian  deficiency
payments  program, then the net  loss will  also include  an  environmental
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cost component.  Even when-the deadweight  loss  component  is small due
to inelastic Canadian  supply response  (Schmitz and others,  1988), a
Canadian  deficiency  payments  program will  have  an environmental  cost.
These  analyses,  together, suggest that an unlimited  U.S.  production
subsidy has  an additional  environmental cost when  the externality occurs
in the  U.S. production  sector. This subsidy  reduces  the environmental
cost of a price-taking  competing exporter when  the production sector  of
the competing exporter  has  the externality.
The Environmental Cost of an Import Restriction
The previous analysis  assumed  that the large  price-setting  exporter set
world  price while the competing  exporter was  a price-taker.  Within  this
framework,  any policy reducing  world price  (such  as an unlimited
production  subsidy) benefits  an importing country when negative
externalities  are present in its  production sector.  Such a policy  reduces
production  in the importing country.  The graphical  analysis of a
price-taking  importer  qualitatively  mimics  the case of a price-taking
competing  exporter and,  for this reason, is not repeated  here.
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world price.  An importer may use  this power  to restrict trade  to protect
the domestic agricultural  sector or to generate  tariff revenues.  In  figure 3,
a large  importer imposes a  tariff.  This policy may  improve the importer's
welfare when the  additional tariff revenue exceeds  the deadweight  loss
due to this tariff.  There  is much literature on  circumstances  under which
an importing country can benefit from a tariff (for  example,  Brander and
Spencer,  1981).
DD is the excess  demand  curve for imports, and EE is the excess  supply
curve  for exports  when exporting countries  ignore social costs.  Price is
set at P1 where import demand is equated with export  supply.  Since the
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exporter's social  costs  exceed  private costs,  the true export supply curve  is
EE'.  If exporting countries  offered  EE', the price would  have  been  P2,
and bP2 would  have been  imported instead of aP1.
Now  suppose  that the importer imposes  a  tariff equal  to be  for each  unit
imported.  This tariff restricts imports to bP2 and restores  the exporting
country to  the solution  that would  obtain if the correct export supply
curve were used.  Both countries could benefit from  this tariff.  The
importing country benefits  from the tariff because  the additional  tariff
revenue,  cdP1P3,  exceeds  the deadweight  loss,  bda.  The exporting  country
suffers  a loss  of producers'  surplus equal  to elP3P1  and a gain in
consumers  surplus'  of giP3P1.  The net loss  efli may be less than the
ensuing  reduction  in environmental damage.  In the absence  of the
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tariff. Both domestic  and foreign nations can gain from a tariff in the
presence  of externalities.
For the case of an externality in the importing country, this analysis  can
be modified  (fig.  4).  D'D' is  the original import  demand curve,  and DD
is the import demand curve when  social costs  are taken into account.
Excluding  social  costs  shifts the import demand curve downward.
Including domestic social costs  causes imports to  rise from cP2 to aP1
and world price increases  from P2 to P1.
Suppose that the importer ignores social costs but gives a per unit subsidy
equal to ab.  The effective domestic price is P3 although the world price
is  now P1.  This consumption  subsidy corrects the phenomenon  of
underimportation.  A second distortion,  again, corrects  the first
distortion.  The problem of importing too little  cannot be corrected  by an
export subsidy because a price-taking  exporter cannot influence world
price.  For a price-taking  exporter with  domestic demand curve DeDe and
domestic supply curve  SeSe, this consumption  subsidy stimulates  exports
from an initial value of ed  to fg.
Conclusions  and Policy Implications
The previous  analysis suggests  several conclusions.  First, a negative
externality in the exporting country causes excessive  exports.  Second,  an
externality in the importing country causes too  little  to be imported.  The
appropriate  policy response here is a substitution  of domestic production
with  imports.  Third, import restriction policies  will take  a nation further
from the social optimum, when  social costs exceed  private  costs  in the
importing country.  Finally, export promotion  policies will hurt an
exporting country, when social costs exceed  private  costs in the exporting
country.
Agricultural  policy seeking to  increase export market  share, by
encouraging domestic production, also imposes an environmental  cost.
Import restricting  policies  similarly stimulate  production in the importing
country and thereby induce an environmental  cost.  This situation  poses a
conflict as policymakers  balance the dual goals of maintaining  farm
income  and reducing environmental  degradation.
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(Bhagwati,  1971; Bhagwati  and Srinivasan,  1983).  When  a  negative
production externality  is input-related,  as with pesticides  and fertilizers,
then a  revenue neutral factor  tax subsidy is the  first-best  policy. This
policy corrects a distortion  at the source.  For an output-related
externality,  a revenue-neutral  production  tax subsidy  is the first-best
policy. Since neither policy raises  new revenues,  no further distortions
follow from these taxes.
When a first-best  policy instrument is unavailable,  trade taxes  or subsidies
can ameliorate  the environmental  problem.  However, these  policies are
less efficient than policies correcting  a distortion  at the source,  unless the
externality is trade-related.  Furthermore,  use of trade taxes  may be
infeasible  in some cases.  For example, the  U.S. constitution  forbids using
an export tax.
A demand  expansion program  pursued  by a large  exporter may reduce
environmental  degradation  for competing exporters  and importers.  A
tariff imposed by  a large importer can also benefit  other importers  and
exporters  when  a negative  production externality  is present  in their
agricultural sectors.  These  conclusions  suggest that further analysis of
how trade policies  affect the environment  and how environmental  taxes or
subsidies  affect  trade is a fruitful  area  for agricultural  trade research.
The Environment and International Trade 96References
Anderson,  K.,  and R.  Blackhurst.  (1992)  The Greening of World Trade
Issues.  London: Harvester  Wheatsheaf.
Bhagwati,  J.  (1971)  "The Generalized  Theory of Distortions  and
Welfare,"  Trade, Balance of Payments, and Growth. J. Bhagwati  (ed.).
Amsterdam:  North  Holland.
Bhagwati,  J., and T.N. Srinivasan.  (1983) Lectures on International  Trade.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Brander, J.A., and B.J.  Spencer.  (1981)  "Tariffs and  the Extraction  of
Foreign  Monopoly Rents under Potential Entry," Canadian  Journal  of
Economics, 14  (3): 371-89.
Canter, L. (1986) Environmental Impacts of Agricultural Production
Activities. Chelsea, MI:  Lewis  Publishing Inc.
Canadian  Agriculture Economic Farm  Management  Society.  (1990)
"Agriculture  and the Environment: Economic Dimensions of Sustainable
Agriculture." Report submitted  to the Agricultural  Institute of Canada.
Carson, Rachel.  (1962)  Silent Spring. Boston MA: Houghton Mifflin.
Kurtilla,  Kerry.  (1991)  "Environmental Regulation  in an Open
Economy," Journal  of Environmental Economics and Management, 20:  127-
42.
Markusen,  J.R.,  and A.G.  Schweinberger.  (1990)  "The Positive Theory  of
Production  Externalities  Under  Perfect  Competition," Journal of
International  Economics, 29:  69-91.
National Research  Council.  (1989) Alternative Agriculture. Washington
DC: National Academy  Press.
Nielsen, E., and L. Lee, (1987)  The Magnitude and Costs of Groundwater
Contamination  from Agricultural Chemicals:  A National Perspective.  Staff
Report AGES870318.  U.S.  Dept.  Agr., Econ. Res.  Serv.
The Conflict  Between  Trade Policy
and Environmental Policy  in Agriculture  97Schmitz,  A., G.C. Van  Kooten, and W.  Hartley Furtan.  (1988)  "Issues  in
Commodity Trade:  Implications  for Natural Resources," Agricultural Trade
and Natural  Resources: Discovering the Critical Linkages.  J. Sutton  (ed.).
Boulder, CO: Lynne  Reiner.
U.S. Department of Agriculture,  Economic  Research  Service.  (1986)
Embargoes, Surplus Disposal,  and U.S. Agriculture. AER-564.
The Environment  and International Trade 98